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Abstract
Existence of spam URLs over emails and Online Social Media (OSM) has become a growing
phenomenon. To counter the dissemination issues associated with long complex URLs in emails
and character limit imposed on various OSM (like Twitter), the concept of URL shortening
gained a lot of traction. URL shorteners take as input a long URL and give a short URL
with the same landing page in return. With its immense popularity over time, it has become
a prime target for the attackers giving them an advantage to conceal malicious content. Bitly,
a leading service in this domain alone shortens close to 80 million links each day, and marks
2-3 million as suspicious every week. 1 Some recent research highlights that services from Bitly
are being exploited heavily to carry out phishing attacks, work from home scams, pornographic
content propagation, etc. In year 2012, one major attack happened in which the U.S. federal
government’s official short link service usa.gov (in collaboration with Bitly) was hijacked to
spread work from home scam. 2 Such attacks which targets seemingly secure and highly trusted
web sources look alarming and also bring to light the massive impact of exploiting the shortening
services. All this imposes additional performance pressure on Bitly and other URL shorteners
to be able to detect and take a timely action against the illegitimate content. It therefore
becomes important to inspect and identify the root cause and gaps in the implementation of
Bitly leading to such attacks. Over the years, multiple defense mechanisms have been set up to
handle traditional long URL spam but detection of short URL spam at zero hour still remains
a challenging task.
In this study, we analyzed a dataset marked as suspicious by Bitly in the month of October
2013 to highlight some ground issues in their spam detection mechanism. Our results reveal the
inefficiency of Bitly in using some spam detection services that it claims to use. We also show
as to how a suspicious Bitly account goes unnoticed despite of a prolonged recurrent illegitimate
activity. Bitly only displays a warning page on identification of suspicious links, but we observed
this approach to be weak in controlling the overall problem of spam. In addition, we identified
some short URL based features and coupled them with two domain specific features to classify
a Bitly URL as malicious / benign. Short URL based feature set that we used comprises of
click dependent as well as click independent metrics, thus our algorithm can also identify a
malicious Bitly URL even before it is actually clicked. The proposed solution is independent
of any available blacklists or lexical URL based features. We used standard machine learning
classification techniques and were able to detect malicious Bitly URLs with a maximum accuracy
of 86.41%. Although our algorithm is designed specific to Bitly, but we believe that it can be
easily extended and used by any other URL shortening services. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first attempt to underline loopholes in security mechanisms of the most popular URL
shortening service by analyzing only content the service itself marks as suspicious, and proposing
a suitable countermeasure. 3
1http://blog.bitly.com/post/138381844/spam-and-malware-protection
2http://www.pcworld.com/article/2012800/spammers-abuse-gov-url-shortener-service-in-workathome-scams.
html
3We have also interacted with ‘Brian Eoff’ (Lead Data Scientist at Bitly) by sharing our analysis and getting
his reactions.
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Chapter 1
Research Motivation and Aim
1.1 Research Motivation
1.1.1 URL shortening services: Background and Use
URL shortening is a technique of mapping a long Uniform Resource Locator (URL) to a short
URL redirecting to the same page. Initially, the concept was used to prevent breaking of
complex URLs while copying text, to accommodate long URLs without line breaks, and for
smooth dissemination of content. Usage of this service nowadays has become a trend in Online
Social Media (OSM) like Facebook and Twitter. Content length restriction imposed by various
OSMs (e.g. Twitter’s 140 character limit) helped popularize their use even further. In order to
accommodate more content in their tweet or Facebook posts, users prefer to compress their long
URL using the existing services and embed this URL in their text. Some top URL shortening
services like bit.ly 1 and goo.gl 2 also track the URLs and provide real time click traffic analysis.
Although these services are created to comfort the users, spammers found their ways to target
and misuse the facility for their own good.
1.1.2 URL shortening services: Abuse
URL shorteners does not only reduce the content length but also help obfuscate the actual
URL behind a shortened link. Spammers take advantage of this obfuscation to misguide the
audience and make quick money by posting malicious links on OSM. These malicious links can
be: i) spam - irrelevant messages sent to large number of people online, ii) scam - online fraud to
mislead people, iii) phishing - online fraud to get personal user credentials, or iv) malware - auto
downloadable content to damage the system. According to a threat activity report by Symantec
in year 2010 [20], around 65% malicious URLs on OSM are shortened URLs. Another study
in year 2012 reveals that around 80% of shortened URLs contained spam-related content [2].
Research by a URL shortener yi.tl reveals that because of deep penetration of spam, 614 out
1https://bitly.com/
2https://goo.gl/
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of 1,002 URL shortening services became dead in year 2012. 3 A recent article in year 2013
also highlights that Facebook spammers makes close to 200 million dollar just by posting these
shortened links to lure users [21].
Bitly, launched in year 2008 is one of the most popular URL shortening and curating services on
the web [18]. It gained major traction when Twitter started to use it as a default URL shortener
in year 2009 before the launch of its own service, t.co in the year 2011. 4 Bitly provides an
interface to its users to create an account and shorten the links. Each link shortened by a user
has a unique global hash (an aggregated identifier corresponding to a link). Such shortened links,
known as bitmarks can then be saved, tracked, and shared. Users are also allowed to connect any
number of Facebook / Twitter accounts with their Bitly accounts. Simple interface and ease of
social media connection makes the task of shortening and sharing a link very convenient. With
80 million new links shortened on Bitly each day and 8 billion clicks each month, spammers
have also been exploiting the service to a great extent. 5 In early 2013, a news article reported
the spread of phishing attacks on Twitter using malicious Bitly links. 6 In this attack, Direct
Messages (DM) of Twitter users were targeted with malicious content that read ‘FYI this profile
on twitter bit.ly/Uf0Cg9 is spreading nasty blogs around about you’. Large number of users
receiving such a message fell in the trap and clicked on the link, which actually redirected to
a website that replicated Twitter’s login page. Victims were then misled that their session was
expired and were made to login again, unknowingly revealing their Twitter credentials to the
attacker. Impact of the attack was such that Twitter announced a temporary restriction on
sending shortened links including Bitly in DM. 7
Fig 1.1 shows another attack where spammers abused the open redirect vulnerabilities of a
popular and legitimate domain belonging to the U.S. federal government, in collaboration with
Bitly. The hijacked domain 1.usa.gov which redirected a user to illegitimate work from home
scam website received around 43,049 clicks from 124 countries within a week, contributing to
15.1% of all 1.usa.gov URLs. 8 This clearly highlights that even branded short URLs are not
safe from exploits. To raise awareness about other dangers associated with URL shorteners, a
researcher from University of Tulsa developed his own shortening service (d0z.me) and conducted
a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) experiment. An attacker could shorten a link using
this service and mention the server to be attacked. d0z.me in turn gave a malicious short URL,
which when clicked introduces a DDoS attack on the targeted server as long as the user remains
on the website. This malicious service witnessed significant number of hits showing the impact
and extent of vulnerabilities of URL shortening services. In October 2013, Bitly also experienced
a massive DDoS attack rendering complete shutdown of its services for close to 7 hours. 9 Some
3http://www.webpronews.com/study-claims-61-of-url-shorteners-are-dead-2012-05
4https://support.twitter.com/articles/109623-about-twitter-s-link-service-http-t-co
5http://www.enterprise.bitly.com/about-us/
6http://news.softpedia.com/news/Twitter-Phishing-Scam-This-Profile-Is-Spreading-Nasty-Blogs-Around-About-You-318618.
shtml
7http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/twitter-may-be-banning-links-in-dms/#!CvRAI
8http://www.pcworld.com/article/2012800/spammers-abuse-gov-url-shortener-service-in-workathome-scams.
html
9http://www.geeknewscentral.com/2013/10/21/twitter-banning-bit-ly-other-url-shortners-on-direct-messages-dm/
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of the spammers have also started to build their own URL shortening services to double shorten
the malicious links, first with a self created short URL service, then again with a legitimate
short URL service to evade security checks. The security researchers from Symantec also found
that spammers abused the services from Bitly to propagate sexually suggestive content [16].
Unlike other URL shortening services like goo.gl, Bitly does not provide a captcha to track the
Figure 1.1: Attack on short URL domain 1.usa.gov leading to work from home scam.
non-human accounts. For protection against spam, Bitly claims to use real-time spam detection
services like Google safe-browsing and SURBL, and flags 2-3 millions of the shortened links as
spam each week. 10 Bitly neither deletes a flagged suspicious link nor suspends the associated
user, but displays a warning page whenever such a link is clicked. Such a warning page is
by-passable and thus does not completely restrict a user to visit a malicious website. Also,
non-deletion of malicious content or account can make it persistent over web. Looking at these
detection measures adopted by Bitly but continued existence of illegitimate content, it becomes
important to understand the security issues associated with the service that deters its efficiency
to handle malicious links.
1.2 Aim
In this work, we perform a detailed analysis on a dataset of suspicious Bitly links (directly
obtained from Bitly) and their associated attributes to:
• Underline the characteristics of domains suspicious Bitly URLs are coming from and the
top referrers being targeted
• Study the impact of malicious Bitly links on OSM
• Inspect Bitly’s current spam detection techniques and expose the associated security issues
• Identify a set of Bitly specific features to detect spam
10http://blog.bitly.com/post/138381844/spam-and-malware-protection
3
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to inspect only data labeled as suspicious
by Bitly to underline security loopholes contributing to such a data and proposing a suitable
solution.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
URL shortening services takes as input a long URL and generates a short URL hash in return.
This short URL so generated redirects to the same long URL but looks random and unrelated
to the actual link. Imposed character limit has lead to immense popularity of such services in
social media landscape. Due to its ubiquitous usage, these services have been hit by adversaries
to obfuscate and disseminate bad content. This section presents the work done in understanding
the usage pattern, behavior, use, misuse of short URLs along with some studies dealing with
the detection of long malicious URLs.
2.1 Malignant Long URL Characterization / Detection
A large number of studies have been conducted to understand the propagation of spam on OSM,
many of which revealed heavy usage of URLs to spread bad content. Benevenuto et al. in their
research identified distinctive features to detect spammers on Twitter for a dataset of 54 million
users and 1.9 billion links [8]. After doing a manual annotation to label spammer / non-spammer,
they defined content and user behavior based features to classify a spammer and achieved an
accuracy of 70%. They also found fraction of tweets with URLs and average number of URLs
in a tweet to be the top feature set in their classification. This clearly highlights the extent to
which URL based metrics alone contribute to spam detection. Researchers also evaluated the
effectiveness of popular blacklists in evading spam and observed it to be very inefficient. In case
of Twitter, it becomes even more slow because of the URL shortening services used to obfuscate
long URLs. Using these services, a spammer can complicate the process of detection by using
chains of multiple shortenings [10]. Grier et al. also pointed out that the clickthrough rate for
Twitter spam (0.13%) is higher than email spam.
Monarch is another system developed by Thomas et al. which classifies a URL submitted to any
web service as malicious or benign in real time [6]. This system relies on the features of URL
landing page, i.e. the page content, behavior, hosting infrastructure, pop-ups, plugins and other
raw attributes which may sometime not be reachable. Although authors claim the accuracy
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to be close to 91%, but heavy text based computation may lead to performance issues. For
our classification, we don’t rely on any such text based features. In year 2012, Aggarwal et al.
also proposed a real time phishing detection system for Twitter, called PhishAri [9]. Authors
coupled the Twitter and URL based features to classify phishing tweets and achieved an accuracy
of 92.52%. In another real time suspicious URL detection technique on Twitter proposed by Lee
et al., authors addresses the problem of conditional URL redirects [11]. Many suspicious websites
perform conditional redirection where a normal user is redirected to a malware / phishing
website, but a crawler is detected and redirected to a normal website. The intention is to
fool web investigators. The authors thus focused on creating a system that would not fall prey
to conditional redirection. A combined feature set of correlated URL redirects and tweet context
information was used and an accuracy of 86.3% was attained.
2.2 Short URL Analysis
With introduction of short URLs in OSM, a comparative look was also necessary to be able to
understand the level of acceptance of the service over long URLs. Kandylas et al. performed a
relative study of long and short Bitly URLs propagation on Twitter and found that Bitly links
received orders of magnitude more clicks than an equal random set of long URLs [5]. They also
observed that the lifetime of spam URLs is shorter as compared to legitimate URLs. To further
comprehend short URL distinctive characteristics, Antoniades et al. performed an analysis on 2
different datasets [3]. They crawled Twitter to extract URLs and found 50% of them to be Bitly.
Another dataset they collected directly by brute force crawling of 2 URL shortening services.
Their results reveal that the lifetime of 50% short URLs exceeds 100 days. They also found a
space gain of 95% using short URLs in their dataset, and observed 54% performance overhead
on using these services.
Other than this generic analysis, Neumann et al. looked at malicious shortened URLs in emails
and highlighted the privacy and security implications of using short URLs [1]. They found a lot
of private user information traces associated with short URLs and observed a low spam detection
rate for 16 shortening services they analyzed. For Bitly, spam detection rate was found to be
57% in their experiment, which can not be stated as optimal for the most popular service in
this domain. Chhabra et al. also gave an overview of evolving phishing attacks through short
URLs on Twitter and found that phishers use URL shorteners not only to gain space but hide
their malicious links [13]. Their results shows that most of the tweets containing phishing URLs
comes from inorganic (automated) accounts. They also observed a change of focus of phishers
from e-commerce websites to OSM and to countries that are developing fast. Later in year 2012,
Klien et al. presented the global usage pattern of short URLs by setting up their own URL
shortening service over a span of 20 months [2]. They identified few features from their usage
log and found short URL usage trends to be different across different countries. Their analysis
also revealed 80% short URL content to be spam related, which can probably be due to the
fact that they did not perform their analysis on some top existing and relatively secure URL
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shortening services.
In year 2013, Maggi et al. performed a large scale study on 25 million short URLs belonging
to 622 distinct URL shortening services [4]. Their results highlights that the countermeasures
adopted by these services to detect spam is not very effective and can be easily bypassed.
Experimental results from their data shows that most of the shortening services that accept
legitimate content initially do not keep a track if content changes to malignant late in time.
They also observed that Bitly allows users to shorten malicious links and does not include any
initial level lightweight check to prevent bad shortenings (though detects it after some time).
Another scheme was proposed by Yoon et al. in year 2013 about using relative words of target
URLs in short URLs [14]. This can give hints to user to guess the target URL, making it
comparatively safe from phishing attacks.
2.3 Malignant Short URL Characterization / Detection
The only work that presents some short URL based features to detect malicious accounts is given
by Wang et al. in year 2013 [12]. In their experiment, they investigated the creators of 600,000
short Bitly URLs and associated click traffic from different countries and referrers. Based on
the analysis, they classify a link as spam / non-spam using only 3 click traffic related features
with maximum accuracy of 90.81%. During the classification, they ignored all the short URLs
that did not receive any clicks. In addition, their results reveal that legitimate Bitly users also
generate spam and most clicks on short malicious URLs comes from popular websites abused
by spammers.
After reviewing all the above techniques, it was evident that a lot of work has been done in
the identification and analysis of malicious URLs on the web. Surprisingly, almost no (very
little) work has been done in analyzing only the suspicious shortened URLs to expose the gaps
in security mechanisms and policies adopted by a specific URL shortening service. Our work
significantly differs from the prior studies as we focus on understanding the ground security
issues associated with a URL shortener that deters its efficiency to handle bad content. Though
our classification problem looks a little similar to the one proposed by Wang et al., but we look
at a more extensive feature set to label a link as malicious / benign. Since we do not only rely
on click traffic based features, our algorithm also works for Bitly URLs that do not receive any
clicks. This is important since it allows early detection of short malicious URLs much before
they target their audience. To the best of our knowledge, the additional short URL feature set
that we identified have not been highlighted in the research community till now.
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Chapter 3
Research contribution
In the first part of our research, we analyze the general characteristics of malicious Bitly URLs
and their impact on OSM. The major findings from this study are:
• Malicious users register domains with a definite purpose of spamming using Bitly. Such
domains are usually short lived and eventually die out after receiving a significant number
of hits.
• There exists large communities propagating bad content through Bitly on Twitter. Such
communities grow in size because Bitly imposes no limit on the number of connected OSM
accounts.
The next part of our study highlights the weaknesses in Bitly’s security policies. Three major
loopholes that we identify are -
• Bity is unable to detect malicious links already tracked by popular blacklist services and
is not even using the claimed spam detection techniques effectively.
• Malicious users exploit Bitly’s no account suspension policy and keep shortening only bad
URLs.
• A Bitly warning page is not a good enough measure to restrict the overall problem of
spam.
After identifying these security issues with Bitly, we propose a technique to classify a Bitly URL
as malicious or benign. The major contributions of this work are -
• Unlike most of the previous studies, our detection mechanism relies on the combined
features of Bitly and some corresponding long URL based features.
• Our technique can work efficiently irrespective of the number of clicks received by a Bitly
URL.
8
• The classification approach works the best to track malicious Bitly links at zero hour, i.e.
when no click is received.
To the best our knowledge, this is the first large scale study to highlight the issues with Bitly’s
spam detection policies and proposing a suitable solution.
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Chapter 4
Solution Approach
In this section, we discuss the two step methodology used in our study.
4.1 Suspicious short URL characterization and exploration of
Bitly’s policies in handling spam
URL shorteners have emerged and gained a special position in link dissemination over web.
Bitly is one of the leading services in this domain, so much so that it alone accounts for about
half of all URL shorteners on Twitter [3]. Its extensive use and popularity has attracted a
lot of spammers to propagate spam. Whenever Bitly identifies a malicious URL, it displays a
warning page to its users. To analyze the basic characteristics of short URL spam, we requested
Bitly to share with us the links that it marks as suspicious. In response, we received a dataset
of 763,160 suspicious Bitly URLs in the month of October 2013. This dataset comprise of the
global hash (an aggregated identifier corresponding to a link), associated long URL, and number
of warning pages displayed for the global hash. We call this our link-dataset. Bitly also provides
with a public API 1 to extract the link and user metrics for a particular short URL. Using the
link-dataset as our seed input and publicly available Bitly API, we collected the analytics for
144,851 (18.98%) links between January 2014 to March 2014 (our data collection is still on).
Table 4.1 presents these analytics. We call this our link-metric-dataset. Using this dataset, we
analyzed the creation / propagation trend as well as the connected social network impact of the
malicious links on Bitly. We also highlighted some major loopholes in the security system and
policies used by Bitly.
4.2 Malicious Short URL Detection
After characterizing the suspicious links obtained from Bitly, we observed and identified few
discriminating short URL based features for spam. We coupled these features with two domain
1http://dev.bitly.com/api.html
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Short URL metric Output data
info link creator and creation time
expand target long URL
clicks last 1000 click history
referring domains domains referring click traffic to the given Bitly URL
encoders users who encoded the given Bitly URL
encoder info Bitly profile name, profile creation date and connected social networks
encoder link history last 100 links shortened by the encoder
Table 4.1: Collected Bitly analytics for suspicious links.
specific features to label a short URL as malicious or benign using standard machine learning
techniques. For training and testing of data, we extracted 34,802 Bitly links from Twitter and
used standard blacklists to formulate the ground truth labeled dataset.
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Chapter 5
Experiments and Analysis
In this section, we focus on the analysis of dataset obtained from Bitly. Our objective in
this research is to highlight some characteristics of malicious short URLs and to bring to light
the weaknesses in security mechanisms used by Bitly. We attempt to answer some unexplored
questions related to short URL spam like: (i) What are the top referrers of suspicious Bitly URLs
and characteristics of domains such content is coming from? (ii) Is Bitly using the claimed spam
detection services effectively? (iii) Do malicious users take advantage of Bitly’s no account
suspension policy? (iv) Does a warning page alone help curtail the overall problem of spam? (v)
How quick is Bitly in identifying suspicious accounts? Answering these questions is important
to investigate the competence and helpfulness of Bitly in dealing with illegitimate content.
5.1 Domain Analysis
Quick and easy availability of domains has made the task of a spammer more convenient. Our
link-dataset of 763,160 suspicious URLs comprised of 22,038 unique domains. Since our target
was to analyze only the malicious domains, we realized that the spammers many-a-times exploit
some legitimate popular domains to propagate spam. Keeping this in mind, we used APWG
(Anti-Phishing Working Group) whitelist and separated all the legitimate domains from our link-
dataset, if any. Here we found 56 exploited domains to be whitelisted. Ignoring these, we created
a python crawler (Fig 5.1) and performed a test on the existence of each suspicious domain 5
months after we received our dataset. It was observed that 83.06% domains no longer exists.
This clearly highlights that such suspicious domains are actually short lived and created with a
dedicated purpose of spamming. To further estimate the average number of times users tried to
visit the links coming from such domains, we looked at the cumulated count of corresponding
Bitly warning pages. Total number of click requests made to these dead domains only in the
month of October was found to be 9,937,250. Spammers thus focus on buying cheap domains to
host malicious content and most of these domains eventually die after achieving a good number
of hits.
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Figure 5.1: Python code snippet to recheck the presence of each domain after 5 months.
5.2 Referrer Analysis
Next, we identified the top referring domains of these suspicious links. For this, we extracted
the link click pattern from referring domain statistics obtained using the Bitly API. Table 5.1
shows the top 5 domains along with their click frequencies in our dataset. In our results, direct
clicks from email clients, messenger, chat applications, or SMS etc. accounted for 20.07% of all
the clicks. Domain www.hkgolden.com, a popular computer information forum in Hong Kong
was found to generate the maximum number of clicks, 52.84% of all. In comparison, even the
top social networking sites (Facebook and Twitter) only accounted for 5.44% and 1.87% of the
total traffic respectively. Surprisingly, this behavior is quite different from that observed in the
earlier research [3, 12, 13], where direct clicks were the maximum and OSM also contributed
more than what we found. One possible reason could be that the approach of spammers evolve
over time and they always keep changing their focus to the most trending online media. Direct
messages have always been targeted by spammers, but here we also identify a drift from OSM
to internet forums. This can be due to a large active user base on these discussion forums and
comparatively less security features implemented, thus an easy catch for attackers.
In order to understand the characteristics of these referrers, we performed an experiment and
limited our study to only Twitter. We did not study Facebook because most of the profiles and
posts on Facebook are generally not public. The internet forum we obtained as the top referrer
(www.hkgolden.com) is also difficult to analyze since it would require web crawling along with
language translation. Thus, we extracted Twitter based referrers in our dataset and obtained
37,903 tweets and 21,679 associated Twitter handles. Automated rechecking of all these tweets
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Referring Domain Clicks
www.hkgolden.com 453,698,974
direct (email, IM, apps) 172,328,021
www.facebook.com 46,702,265
twitter.com 16,032,903
www.poringa.net 9,643,144
Table 5.1: Top 5 referring domains for suspicious Bitly links.
was also done to determine their state. Doing so, we found that 5,302 (13.99%) tweets no longer
exists and 5,444 (14.36%) tweets came from 3,729 (17.20%) users who are now suspended. Fig 5.2
gives the corresponding pie-chart representation. Also, 636 of the tweets were protected, which
left us with 26,521 tweets and 13,442 Twitter handles that we could actually analyze. We also
observed that 3,289 (15.17%) users changed their Twitter handles during the time of our study.
One possible explanation for this behavior could be that these are malicious users who try to
change their identities so as to evade or delay detection by Twitter.
Figure 5.2: Tweets from referrers.
In order to further analyze these Twitter profiles, we extracted their last 200 (or less) tweets
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using the Twitter API 1. Here we assume 200 tweets as a reasonable sample to study a user
behavior. To examine the presence of Twitter profiles that use Bitly with a dedicated purpose
of spamming, we proceeded to identify their tweet pattern. For this, we computed the Jaccard
Similarity Coefficient over all pair of tweets for each user by removing the URLs if any. Jaccard
Similarity Coefficient is used to compute the similarity between two sample sets (A and B) and
is defined as:
J(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B| (5.1)
After computing the Jaccard coefficient for each tweet pair from a user, we calculated its overall
variance. Users with extremely low variance here signifies the ones who post similar tweet text.
In addition to this, cross URL (expanded) and domain level matching was also performed. With
this we found 17 Twitter profiles with extremely low variance (<0.00012) on tweet and URL /
domain similarity. On a manual annotation of these profiles, we found 3 suspicious profiles which
posted only explicit pornographic content and looked like bots and 1 suspicious profile posted
links promoting work from home scam. 11 profiles had less than 3 tweets, so we ignored them
and 2 profile got suspended. Fig 5.3(a) and Fig 5.3(b) shows hour of the day versus minute of
the hour graph for tweets posted by 2 identified suspicious profiles, @dtitgp2 and @fujisakikaoru
respectively. The graph clearly shows an automated pattern of posting tweets and confirms that
both of these profiles are actually bots. On further inspection we found that all these suspicious
profiles are still active and posting malicious links. Since all this was done programmatically and
we did not manually annotate each and every account, we might have missed highlighting other
suspicious profiles. To verify this, we manually annotated the Twitter profiles which referred
a large number (at least 100) of malicious Bitly links from our link-metric dataset. Using this
we filtered 23 profiles which are not suspended by Twitter and still actively posting already
detected malicious Bitly links. All this makes it evident that the detection of malicious Bitly
URLs can also help identify suspicious Twitter profiles. The results also highlights that only
detection but no deletion of these Bitly links does not restrict the activities of spammers.
5.3 Connected Network Impact Analysis
Bitly allows its users to connect to any number of Facebook and Twitter accounts. With these
accounts connected, it becomes easy for a user to shorten and share Bitly links at one click.
In this section we present as to how Bitly users abuse this service. To investigate, we first
extracted all the encoders 2 of URLs in our link-metric-dataset and found 12,344 distinct Bitly
users (encoders) from 413,119 malicious Bitly URLs. Next, we used the Bitly API to collect
information about their connected profile network. With this we obtained 5,375 users with a
connected Twitter or Facebook account. Looking at individual level, we found 3,415 (63.54%)
users connected only Twitter, 951 (17.69%) only Facebook, and 1,009 (18.77%) connected both
the networks in our dataset. This gives a clear understanding that majority malicious users
1https://dev.twitter.com/docs/api/1.1
2We use ‘encoders’ and ‘users’ interchangeably.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Hour of the day vs. Minute of the hour graph for Twitter user - (a) @dtitgp2. (b) @fu-
jisakikaoru.
prefer to connect their Twitter profiles over Facebook. Possible explanation for low Facebook
connections could be because Bitly does not allow a user to connect Facebook brand or fan pages
for free. 3 Limitation to connect to only a personal Facebook account might restrict spammers
to disseminate more malicious content in public, but there is no such documented limitation for
Twitter.
On further inspection of the data, we found 507 Bitly users connected multiple Twitter accounts
of which 28 users connected at least 10 Twitter accounts. Analyzing these profiles in the same
manner we studied the referrers, we extracted their the top (last) 200 tweets. Our target here
was to compare multiple profiles connected by each user and infer a possible reason behind their
connection. We extracted the URLs posted by all Twitter accounts connected to one Bitly user
and did a cross URL / domain comparison. We also collected the link history (last 100) of these
users using the Bitly API. All these links were checked for a Bitly warning page by making get
requests in python. At last we manually annotated these accounts by looking at the tweet text
and URL similarity scores. From this experiment we could identify 3 different cross-network
communities that existed across Bitly and Twitter in our dataset -
• Community 1: The first community consisted of 27 Bitly users with 1 associated Twitter
account each. All these users shortened links from the same domain and had similar looking
user handles starting with “o ” followed by some random hash. Last 100 links shortened
by all these users were also redirected to a Bitly warning page. Most surprisingly, all the
associated Twitter accounts got suspended when we checked these profiles later and the
Bitly profiles looked dormant. It confirms the existence of this malicious community which
used Bitly as a medium to propagate spam on Twitter.
• Community 2: Another community that we detected consisted of 2 Bitly users with
3http://support.bitly.com/knowledgebase/articles/76455-how-do-i-connect-my-facebook-and-twitter-account-t
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28 associated Twitter accounts each. Also, during the course of our study one of these
Bitly accounts connected 2 more Twitter accounts. 13 of the accounts did not exist
when we checked again and other 45 looked malicious and shared similar tweet text and
URLs. This community of 2 Bitly and 45 Twitter accounts appears to be an active
spam campaign. Fig 5.4 presents the connected Twitter account network corresponding
to one Bitly user (o 253fc8b7cp), and Fig 5.5(a) shows the snapshot of one Twitter profile
(@viajesyturismo2 ) that belongs to this campaign. y
• Community 3: The third community composed of 2 Bitly accounts with 9 Twitter
accounts each. All these 18 Twitter accounts shared similar explicit pornographic content.
This malicious community is dormant on Bitly but still active on Twitter. Fig 5.5(b)
shows the snapshot of Twitter user @NghiTu One, a part of this community.
These communities originated from Bitly to spread malicious content on Twitter. Presence of
such big communities propagating bad content clearly highlights the abuse of connected network
on Bitly, more importantly because Bitly imposes no limit on the number of networks a user
can connect.
Figure 5.4: Bitly account from community 2 (o 253fc8b7cp) connected to 28 Twitter accounts. Red
node denotes the Bitly account, yellow node represents active Twitter accounts, and blue node represents
non-existent Twitter accounts.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.5: Twitter profile snapshot of - (a) User viajesyturismo2 of community 2. (b) User NghiTu One
of community 3.
5.4 System Security Analysis
Till now, we looked at a generalized characterization of malicious Bitly links by studying the
domains they arrive from, the target domains, as well as their connected social network. The
above results highlight that how spammers use Bitly as a start point to propagate spam over
other media. It now becomes important to comprehend whether Bitly is taking enough measures
to deal with such a content and the users it is coming from. In this section, we do a focused
study to understand as to how Bitly react in this situation.
5.4.1 Efficiency Analysis
To infer the efficiency of Bitly in detection of malicious links and users, we conduct a two step
experiment.
Comparison Against Some Popular Blacklists
We performed a check for malicious Bitly links detected by three popular blacklist services-
Anti-Phishing Working Group 4 (APWG), VirusTotal 5, and SURBL 6. To collect data from
APWG, we requested for APWGs live feed service and set it up on our MySql database writing
some python scripts. With this service, we collected the data for 6 months (October 2013 -
March 2014) and obtained a total of 142,660 and a daily feed of around 746 APWG marked
malicious links. Of these, we got 216 Bitly links directly. In order to extract more Bitly links
from this dataset, we performed a reverse link lookup by shortening the long malicious URLs
and checking their existence on Bitly using Bitly API. Whenever a link is shortened using Bitly
4http://www.antiphishing.org/
5https://www.virustotal.com/
6http://www.surbl.org/
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API, it returns a parameter called new hash, indicating whether this link is shortened for the
first time or is pre-existent. We collected only the pre-existent links using this technique. With
the direct and reverse lookup, we obtained a total of 2,872 APWG marked malicious Bitly
links. Next, we wrote a python script to make get requests to Bitly and check if Bitly gives a
warning page for these malicious URLs. To our surprise, Bitly could only detect 382 of 2,872
(13.30%) malicious links. Though Bitly does not claim to use APWG, but such low rate still
looks alarming as APWG is a popular and trusted source to detect phishing. 86% undetected
phishing links in 6 months does not give a good picture about the spam detection techniques
used by Bitly.
In parallel to APWG data collection, we also looked for the malicious links marked by VirusTotal
over the same time period. VirusTotal is a free online service that characterize a URL as
malicious using 52 different website / domain scanning engines and datasets 7. For this, we
implemented a web crawler in python and set up a cron job to perform daily look ups on
VirusTotal to capture all Bitly links it marks as malicious. With this, we received 569 malicious
Bitly links. We again checked these links for a Bitly warning page and found 407 of 569 (71.53%)
links undetected by Bitly. Since VirusTotal is a collated result set from 52 detection services,
such high undetection rate again highlights how Bitly misses on a lot of spam.
In addition to these popular blacklists which Bitly does not claim to use in its spam detection
process, we considered a third measure (SURBL) that Bitly profess to apply. SURBL is a
domain or IP level blacklist created from the occurrence of websites in unsolicited messages.
Fig 5.6 shows the process diagram for this experiment. To check against SURBL, we used Bitly
API to collect the link history (last 100 or less) of all encoders of the suspicious Bitly links in
our link-metric-dataset. We received 717,644 Bitly links from 12,344 distinct Bitly encoders.
On link expansion, the number of associated domains found were 63,693. Links corresponding
to 47,225 domains displayed no Bitly warning page. We also checked these domains against
SURBL using SURBL API 8 implemented in python and obtained 750 domains blacklisted by
SURBL. Looking at the intersection, we found 275 (36.66%) domains blacklisted by SURBL but
undetected by Bitly.
Figure 5.6: Process diagram to find SURBL blacklisted domains undetected by Bitly.
7https://www.virustotal.com/en/about/credits/
8https://pypi.python.org/pypi/surblclient/
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Figure 5.7: Frequency distribution of SURBL domains undetected by Bitly (with frequency more than
1).
These 275 domains contributed to 2,244 links in our dataset. Fig 5.7 presents the frequency
distribution of 129 of these undetected domains with occurrence more than one. Subgraph in
the same figure starting from domain freeloadfile.ru highlights the frequency distribution more
clearly. This shows that there are multiple Bitly links corresponding to most of these domains,
maximum being 329 for domain timesfancy.in. Also, there are 16 domains with frequency more
than 50. These experimental results clearly highlights that leaving other popular blacklists aside,
Bitly is not even using the claimed spam detection services effectively. Also, such undetected
domains contribute to a large number of links if looked at a greater scale. Thus, letting bypass
a single malicious domain can act as an invitation to a huge amount of spam.
Suspicious User Profile Identification
After looking at the inefficiency of Bitly in identifying suspicious links, we proceeded with the
detection of suspicious Bitly accounts. On the analysis of all links in encoder’s link history,
we obtained 112,697 links redirecting to a Bitly warning page (from 12,344 encoders), giving
us more suspicious URLs. With this knowledge, we looked at the fraction of suspicious links
shortened by different encoders by assigning a Suspicion Factor for each as :-
Suspicion Factor =
#Links redirecting to Bitly warning page
#total links collected
(5.2)
Here we define Suspicion Factor as the ratio of shortened links giving a Bitly warning page to the
total links collected for each encoder. Fig 5.8 shows the cumulative distribution on number of
Bitly users based on their Suspicion Factor. The graph shows that 12,344 users had a Suspicion
Factor less than or equal to 1, and 10,326 users had a Suspicion Factor less than or equal to
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0.99. This means that 2,018 (12,344 - 10,326) out of 12,344 encoders (16.35%) had a Suspicion
Factor of 1, indicating that they shortened only suspicious links. Also 2,558 encoders (20.72%)
had at least 80% of their shortened URLs as malicious (Suspicion Factor >= 0.8). This clearly
highlights the malicious intent of these encoders on creating their Bitly accounts. As of now,
Bitly follows a no user suspension policy and does not even delete a malicious link. 9 This
facilitates the continued existence of a large number of encoders with such evil motives. All
these accounts still exists and looks legitimate on viewing their profile. Its only when a user
visits multiple links from these profiles leading to malicious content, he gets to know that the
profile is created for a dedicated purpose of spamming. This approach is quite different from
that followed by Twitter, wherein a suspicious user once detected is immediately suspended to
prevent further dissemination of bad content. 10 Looking at the extent to which spammers are
leveraging the policies used by Bitly, it becomes important for Bitly to also create a workaround
to this problem. If not breaking the links, one simple solution could be to assign a credibility
score (like Suspicion Factor) to each profile so as to apprise the users visiting that profile of
upcoming risks if any. This approach has also been explored by Gupta et al. wherein a tweet
can be assigned a credibility score based on various intrinsic characteristics [22].
Figure 5.8: Cum ulative distribution on number of Bitly users posting suspicious links.
5.4.2 Promptness Analysis
Our results in the above experiment clearly brings to light as to how Bitly users keep shortening
only malicious URLs. Till this point of our study, it was unknown to us as to how (if at all)
Bitly reacts to suspicious user profiles. To report our findings and get some insights, we made
a blog entry on our initial data analysis, in response to which we were informed that Bitly does
9http://blog.bitly.com/post/138381844/spam-and-malware-protection
10https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules
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not suspend user accounts but forbids suspicious users from creating any new links (Fig 5.9). 11
Also, since this information is only known to Bitly and the user who is no longer allowed to
shorten the links, we could not get this data. But to verify this claim, we performed another
experiment to observe the promptness of Bitly in detecting suspicious user profiles. For this,
Figure 5.9: Brian’s (Lead Data Scientist at Bitly) reply to out Twitter post about the blog.
we only considered the highly suspicious profiles obtained from the last experiment. We label
a profile as highly suspicious if the user has shortened at least 100 links in his link history and
all the links give a Bitly warning page, i.e. user has a Suspicion Factor of 1. Using this filter,
we obtained 80 such highly suspicious profiles in our dataset. encoder link history metric from
the Bitly API was then used to extract the creation time and number of clicks for all 100 links
from each profile. At last, we cumulated the number of links created and clicks received per
month and formulated a timeline for each user. The maximum month lag of shortening malicious
links that we observed was 24 months for user bamsesang (Fig 5.10(a)), followed by 18 months
for user iplayonlinegames (Fig 5.10(b)). The timeline shows that user bamsesang shortened all
malicious links for 7 months, remained inactive for close to one year and then shortened the
bad URLs again. On the other hand, user iplayonlinegames remained active throughout. These
users posted links even when the number of clicks received were less. This highlights that they
11http://precog.iiitd.edu.in/blog/2013/12/bitly-could-do-better/
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might be posting links randomly and not monitoring their impact. In contrast, some malicious
links shortened by these users did not go unnoticed and received a significant number of hits.
Out of 80 highly suspicious users that we labeled, 7 users posted with the month lag greater
than 5. These results clearly show an extreme hold-up in suspicious user identification (if at all)
by Bitly.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5.10: (a) Link history timeline for user bamsesang. (b) Link history timeline for user iplayon-
linegames. The link sharing interval and click pattern clearly reflects the malicious activity being carried
out for a long time.
All this was observed when we only took into consideration past 100 (or less) continuous mali-
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cious links for each user. There could have been highly active suspicious users who shortened
100 or more malicious links within a single day or so, but had a very high value of month lag
if all their links are studied. Since Bitly API gives only last 100 entries in a single request, this
would have required making multiple requests per user to capture the complete link history.
We did not do this in our study due to space and time constraints. But in order to check if
these highly suspicious users have actually been forbidden by Bitly, we collected their recent
link history (after 1 January 2014). We found that 4 of these 80 users were still active and prop-
agating malicious content. Table 5.2 lists these 4 users along with their last Bitly link posted
date. Even for the rest, it can not be said if they have been prohibited from link creation by
Bitly or themselves did not create more links. This looks really surprising since Bitly asserted
that it disallows suspicious users to shorten more links. All this evidently signifies the ease of
penetration of spammers on Bitly and delay in its suspicious user detection process which it
actually claims to follow.
Bitly user Date of last link posted
insiderslive 20 March 2014
o 2flgs1l3eo 20 March 2014
joeschellenberg4 5 March 2014
jdkrause 15 January 2014
Table 5.2: Confirm undetected highly suspi-
cious Bitly users.
Bitly hash #Warnings Click state
14UHah9 2,180,862 no
18PVWD4 1,854,529 no
9eTLS0 1,009,871 yes
18lMytM 464,354 yes
olZa60 289,687 yes
13fqZwE 109,646 yes
4x4Ot5 102,698 yes
19EH50H 88,698 no
A2p3qT 70,375 yes
14VvSWK 45,380 yes
Table 5.3: Top 10 popular malicious Bitly links
and their recent click state.
5.4.3 Tractability Analysis
After identifying an extreme delay in the detection of suspicious user profiles by Bitly, we
inspected if the access to all popular malicious Bitly links eventually die out after Bitly discovers
them. Here we define popular malicious Bitly links as the ones with high number of warning
pages displayed. This is important to study because it gives a clear picture about the persistence
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of already identified malignant 12 URL propagation through Bitly network. Also, we restricted
our study to only popular links because we wanted to capture the URLs with high overall impact.
As a sample for this experiment, we extracted the top 1000 Bitly links from our link-dataset
based on the number of warning pages reported in the month of October 2013. Bitly API was
then used to collect the click history of all these links. Next, we determined and separated the
links which got recently clicked (after January 2014). Using this measure, we found 352 out
of 1000 malicious links (35.2%) which are also being actively clicked in year 2014. Table 5.3
presents the top 10 of these 1000 popular malicious links along with their recent click state. From
the table, 7 of 10 malicious Bitly links with more than 70,000 warning pages already displayed
are still active in terms of luring users and receiving clicks. This sample study shows that even
though Bitly detected these suspicious links months before, users are still getting trapped and
visiting these links. These results help us comprehend that a by-passable Bitly warning page
alone is not a strong enough measure to help curtail the dissemination of spam. No control over
the access to already detected malicious links can heavily encourage spammers to use Bitly.
12We use ‘malignant’ and ‘malicious’ interchangeably.
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Chapter 6
Data Collection and Labeling for
Link Classification
Now, for malicious short URL detection, we start with data collection for our analysis to build
a true positive dataset of malicious Bitly links. This process involves two steps as shown in
Fig 6.1, (i) collecting data from Twitter, (ii) labeling the short URLs as malicious or benign.
Figure 6.1: Data collection and labeling.
6.1 Data Collection
In order to collect the data, we used Twitter Rest API 1 and its “search” method to get only
tweets with a Bitly URL. Here we restricted our search query to “bit.ly” and collected a total
of 412,139 tweets with 34,802 distinct Bitly URLs between 12 February 2014 to 15 March 2014.
We call this the unlabeled-dataset.
1https://dev.twitter.com/docs/api/1.1
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6.2 Data Labeling
To formulate a labeled dataset of malicious or benign Bitly URLs, we queried Google Safebrows-
ing, SURBL, PhishTank, and VirusTotal APIs. Google Safebrowsing 2 is a repository of sus-
pected phishing or malware pages maintained by Google Inc. The Google Safebrowsing API
accepts an HTTP GET /POST request to lookup a URL and returns a JSON object describ-
ing whether the URL is “phishing”, “malware”, or “ok”. SURBL 3 is a consolidated list of
websites that appear in unsolicited messages. SURBL lookup feature allows a user to check a
domain name against the ones blacklisted by SURBL. For this we used SURBL client library
implemented in python. 4 PhishTank 5 is a public crowdsourced database of phishing URLs.
The PhishTank API uses an HTTP post request and returns the status of a URL (presence or
absence in its database) in a JSON format. VirusTotal 6 is an aggregated information warehouse
of malicious links and domains as marked by 52 website scanning engines and contributed by
users. The VirusTotal API also allows an HTTP POST request and gives a JSON response indi-
cating results from all website scanning engines it uses. In order to label our unlabeled-dataset,
we mark a Bitly URL as malicious if the corresponding expanded URL or domain is detected
by any of these blacklists.
In addition to these blacklists, we also label a Bitly URL as malicious if it is detected by Bitly
itself. Bitly uses various blacklisting services and other measures to detect spam and throws a
warning page whenever it identifies a malignant URL. We perform this check for all Bitly URLs
in our unlabeled-dataset and label a URL as malicious if a warning page is displayed. Using
these techniques, we obtained 8,000 distinct malicious Bitly URLs from our unlabeled-dataset
of 34,802 Bitly URLs. We call this the labeled-dataset.
2https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/
3http://www.surbl.org/
4https://pypi.python.org/pypi/surblclient/
5https://www.phishtank.com/
6https://www.virustotal.com/
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Chapter 7
Feature Selection for Malicious Bitly
URL Detection
Long URL based features to classify a malicious link has been studied over years. Our target
in this work is to inspect if short URL based features also hold some distinctive properties to
identify a short malicious URL. Since it becomes difficult to capture the intrinsic characteristics
of the landing page by using the short URL based features alone, we follow a combined approach
by coupling short URL and some long URL based features. This section presents the feature
set we identify to classify a Bitly URL as malicious or benign. Table 7.1 gives the complete list
of features used for our analysis. 1
7.1 WHOIS based features
WHOIS is a query and response protocol that gives information like domain name, domain
creation / updation date and domain expiration date for a particular URL. This information
is particularly useful to detect domains which are intentionally created for malicious purposes.
Most spammers prefer to register their domains for a short duration and also change the domains
frequently to evade detection. In our domain analysis section (Chapter 5), we observed 83.06%
malicious domains to be non-existent when we rechecked them after 5 months. This gives a
clear understanding that malicious domains are usually short lived. Thus, we use WHOIS based
features like domain creation and expiration dates to track the lifetime of URLs in our labeled-
dataset. Also, it is commonly observed that suspicious domains are created or updated just
before they are actually used. Therefore, we also use the difference between domain creation
and Bitly link creation time as one of our feature.
1We restrict our analysis to only Bitly.
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Feature Description
WHOIS based features
Domain age Difference between domain creation / updation date
and expiration date
Link Creation domain creation difference Difference between domain creation date and Bitly
link creation date
Bitly specific features (Non-Click based)
Link creation hour Bitly link creation hour
Number of encoders Number of Bitly users who encoded a particular link
Type of encoders Ratio of anonymous or application based encoders to
total encoders
Bitly specific features (Click based)
Link creation-click lag Difference in days between Bitly link creation date
and date of first click received
Type of referring domains Ratio of referring domains from a direct source to
the total referring domains
Table 7.1: Features used for classification of malicious Bitly URLs.
7.2 BITLY specific features
Bitly provides a detailed analytics about each link it shortens. This includes some general link
properties along with the click and user history corresponding to each Bitly URL. We assume
that these analytics contain a lot of hidden properties that can help segregate malicious and
benign links. To test our assumption, we identify some Bitly specific short URL based features
and divide these as Non-Click based and Click based. Non-Click based features are the ones which
define general characteristics of a short Bitly URL and are independent of its click history. Click
based features on the other hand depends on the click analytics of a Bitly link.
7.2.1 Non-Click based features
We determine 3 Non-Click based features:
• Link creation hour: Malicious users many-a-times rely on automated mechanisms to
shorten and share the links. Link shortening timestamp patterns in case of such automated
approaches might not be similar to the genuine usage trend. For example, a malicious user
would be more likely to create a link at 0300 hours (IST) than a human. The idea could
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be to automatically shorten multiple bad URLs late at night to propagate it the next day.
This kind of automated behavior can thus be captured by tracking link creation hour of
the Bitly links.
• Number of encoders: Encoders are the list of Bitly users who encode the same Bitly
URL. Bitly creates different local hashes but the global hash for all Bitly URLs redirecting
to the same page is unique. Number of distinct encoders corresponding to a Bitly URL
depicts its popularity. As highlighted in section 5.3, malicious communities take advantage
of this feature by creating multiple identities to shorten the same link. This trick helps
to spread malicious content at a greater pace. We use this feature in order to detect the
presence of such suspicious communities in our dataset.
• Type of encoders: Encoders can either be regular Bitly users or users who use some
third party services provided by Bitly. These third party services like TweetDeck API,
Twitterfeed, Tweetbot, etc. provides a single interface for users to shorten and share
the links on multiple OSM. 2 Since we collect our dataset using Twitter, we focus on
only Twitter based applications. Twitterfeed is a service to feed content to Twitter.
TweetDeck API is an API service for TweetDeck, which provides a dashboard to manage
Twitter. Tweetbot is a full featured Twitter client for iPhone. Offenders many a times use
such services to make their task of sharing malicious links easy. In addition to these third
party services, various Bitly links are also shortened anonymously by users. In case of such
anonymous shortening, Bitly gives the encoder information as “someone” or “anonymous”.
In our link-metric-dataset, we observe traces of malicious users who hide their identities
and shorten bad links. Anonymous Bitly link shortening and third party service usage can
therefore be used as a feature to identify malicious links.
7.2.2 Click based features
We determine 2 Click based features:
• Link creation-click lag: Difference in days between link creation and first click received
by a Bitly URL is another distinct feature we recognized. Antoniades et al. stated that
most legitimate short URLs are clicked on the same day they are created [3]. The average
lifetime of malicious short URLs have also been reported to be higher than that of the
legitimate ones [4]. This gives a notion that malicious short URLs do not gain immedi-
ate popularity and the number of clicks on such URLs evolve slowly. A possible reason
behind this phenomenon can be that malicious URLs are generally shared by less reliable
sources which may not receive instant clicks. Hence, we include link creation-click lag as
a characteristic feature to capture how quick the short URL resolves.
• Type of referring domains: Domains referring click traffic to a particular link also
holds some distinguishing properties to classify a short malicious URL. Our analysis in
2https://bitly.com/pages/partners
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Chapter 5 reveals that a large fraction of malicious Bitly URLs get clicked directly through
email clients, messengers, chat applications, SMS, etc. To further test these results, we
use the fraction of referring domains that contributes to direct clicks as another feature in
our classification.
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Chapter 8
Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the mechanisms used in our classification of malicious short URLs.
Our target is to be able to detect such URLs with high accuracy. The experiments involve a 3
step process i) creating a labeled dataset, ii) training the suitable machine learning classifier,
and iii) testing an unlabeled dataset on the trained classifier. We collected our initial dataset
of Bitly URLs using Twitter and labeled it as malicious / benign by checking against popular
blacklists, as already discussed. Classification algorithms involve training on such pre-labeled
dataset, based on which it predicts the labels of an unseen data. Here we want our classifier to
predict if a given unseen Bitly URL is malicious or benign. This section explains the machine
learning classifiers we used in our experiments.
8.1 Machine Learning Classification
In order to assess the most appropriate and efficient mechanism to detect malicious short URLs,
we inspect various machine learning classifiers which are best suited for our study. For this, we
use the classifiers implemented in Weka software package [15]. Weka is an open source collection
of machine learning classifiers for data mining tasks. We performed our experiments on some
of the popular classification algorithms in Weka. Now, we give a brief description about these
classifiers.
8.1.1 Naive Bayes Classifier
This is a simple probabilistic classifier based on the Bayes’ theorem. It assumes all classification
features to be independent of one another and works best when the dimensionality of inputs is
very high. Parameter estimation in naive bayes uses maximum likelihood principle, thus a data
point is classified into the class with highest probability. An advantage of using this model is that
it does not have a large training data requirement for parameter estimation and classification.
It uses variance of variables in each class and is also not sensitive to irrelevant features. To
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implement this algorithm, we use NaiveBayes classifier in Weka. 1
8.1.2 Decision Tree Classifier
This is one of the most popular classification techniques that uses decision tree as a predictive
model. It follows a rule based approach to observe data features and make conclusions about
the item’s target value. Decision Tree starts at the root and makes binary (yes / no) decisions
at each level until it reaches the leaf node. We use Weka’s j48 tree classifier for this study. 2
8.1.3 Random Forest Classifier
Random Forest is a classifier that consists of multiple decision trees and outputs the class
which is the mode of the classes output by individual trees. For each data point, it randomly
chooses a set of features for classification. It uses averaging to select most important features
hence improve the predictive accuracy and control over-fitting. It can run efficiently on large
databases. This method is also useful for estimating missing data and maintains accuracy even
when a large proportion of the data are missing. To implement this, we use RandomForest tree
classifier in Weka. 3
8.2 Training and Testing Data
We divide our labeled-dataset into training (75%) and test data (25%). Ten fold cross validation
is applied on the training data over all classifiers. Here the data is partitioned into 10 subsets.
In each test run, 9 subsets are used for training and 1 is used for testing. This training-testing
process repeats 10 times and average accuracy of each classifier is analyzed. The remainder 25%
test data is then supplied to determine the actual performance of the classifier on an unseen
(unlabeled) dataset, which gives our final classification results.
1http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/classifiers/bayes/NaiveBayes.html
2http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/classifiers/trees/J48.html
3http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/classifiers/trees/RandomForest.html
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Chapter 9
Classifier Evaluation
We already defined the feature set and machine learning algorithms used in our classification.
This section describes the evaluation metrics and results we obtained from our experiments
based on the ground truth dataset.
9.1 Evaluation Metrics
Two major metrics that we use for the evaluation of our classifier are F-measure (FM) and accu-
racy (A). F-measure is defined in terms of precision (P) and recall (R). Precision (Equation 9.1)
is the proportion of predicted positives in the class that are actually positive, while recall (Equa-
tion 9.2) is the proportion of the actual positives in the class which are predicted positive. This
dependency can be better described by a confusion matrix as presented in Fig 9.1. Each row of
Figure 9.1: Confusion matrix showing relation between True Positives (TP), False Positives (FP), True
Negatives (TN), and False Negatives (FN).
the confusion matrix represents the instances in an actual class, whereas each column represents
the instances in a predicted class. Confusion matrix is very useful in understanding the relation
between true positives (correctly identified values), false positives (incorrectly identified values),
true negatives (correctly rejected values), and false negatives (incorrectly rejected values). With
this knowledge, F-measure and accuracy can be easily computed. F-measure (Equation 9.3)
is a weighted average of precision and recall, and accuracy (Equation 9.4) is the closeness of
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measurements to the actual (true) value.
P = TP/(TP + FP ) (9.1)
R = TP (TP + FN) (9.2)
FM = 2 ∗ (P ∗R)/(P + R) (9.3)
A = (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN) (9.4)
9.2 Evaluation Results
We now describe the results obtained from our classification experiments. We trained and tested
three classifiers - Naive Bayes, Decision Tree, and Random Forest (as discussed in Chapter 8)
using 7 features described in chapter 7. Our true positive dataset is split into 75% training and
25% test set. With this, the classifiers are trained on a ground truth of 5,926 malicious and 6,074
benign short URLs and 10 fold cross validation is applied. At last, we evaluate our classifier on
the remainder 25% dataset (2,074 malicious and 1,926 benign Bitly URLs). Table 9.1 presents
the outcome from each of these classifiers. We notice that as we move from Naive Bayes to
Evaluation Metric Naive Bayes Decision Tree Random Forest
Accuracy 72.15% 78.37% 80.43%
Recall (malicious) 73.10% 82.40% 81.00%
Recall (Benign) 71.10% 74.10% 79.90%
Precision (malicious) 73.10% 77.40% 81.20%
Precision (Benign) 71.10% 79.60% 79.60%
F-measure (malicious) 73.10% 76.70% 81.10%
F-measure (benign) 71.10% 76.70% 79.70%
Table 9.1: Results of classification of malicious Bitly URLs using all 7 features.
Decision Tree, the accuracy and F-measure increases for malicious as well as benign class. With
the implementation of Random Forest, both these metrics increases even further. This increase
in accuracy by Random Forest is attributed to the point that it considerably reduces the false
positives in our classification. Hence, we achieved an overall accuracy of 80.43% and weighted
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average of F-measure as 80.40%.
We understand that our training dataset is a mix of Bitly links that receive and do not receive
clicks. Of the 8,000 malicious ground truth links in our labeled-dataset, we found that 3,693
(46.16%) links were never clicked by anyone. Although this property itself serves as a feature
in the above classification, but we believe that our classifier should perform even better if we
segregate all links with zero clicks. This is because such links can be easily classified using
only Non-Click based features. Therefore, we separate Bitly links with zero clicks and obtain a
true positive malicious dataset of 3,693 (46.16%) from a total of 8,000 links. We also randomly
select 3,693 benign links with no clicks from the labeled-dataset and perform our classification
experiments again by removing Click-Based features. Table 9.2 gives the results from this
classification. As expected, an increase in the overall accuracy and F-measure for each classifier
is observed. With Random Forest, we achieve a high accuracy of 86.41% and weighted average
of F-measure as 86.40%. Also, when we tested our complete labeled-dataset again by excluding
Click based features, we attained a maximum accuracy of 83.50% and F-measure for malicious
class increased to 84.1% (using Random Forest).
Previous studies on phishing emails and links on Twitter also shows that Random Forest works
the best as compared to other classifiers [9, 17]. In order to further inspect the performance of
Random Forest in our experiments, we analyze the confusion matrix for complete as well as Non-
Click labeled-dataset (Fig 9.2). For complete labeled-dataset, we could correctly identify 81%
of malicious short URLs but 19% of malicious links were misclassified as benign. On a manual
inspection of some of these misclassified profiles, we observed their click pattern captured in our
feature set to be quite similar to that of the benign profiles. In case of Non-Click labeled-dataset,
the correct classification rate reached 89.60% and misclassification rate dropped to almost half
(10.40%). Also, on removing Click-Based features from complete labeled-dataset, true positive
increased to 84.20% and false negative decreased to 15.8%. This indicates that our Non-Click
based features are alone good at classifying a malicious Bitly link, irrespective of looking at its
click history. Although our proposal is capable of capturing the click patterns of a link, it can
be particularly helpful to detect malicious Bitly links at zero hour, i.e. even before it is actually
clicked.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 9.2: Confusion matrix for - (a) complete labeled-dataset. (b) only Non-Click data from labeled-
dataset. (c) complete labeled-dataset by applying only Non-Click based features.
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Evaluation Metric Naive Bayes Decision Tree Random Forest
Accuracy 80.02% 85.06% 86.41%
Recall (malicious) 79.60% 89.50% 89.60%
Recall (Benign) 80.40% 80.80% 83.40%
Precision (malicious) 79.30% 81.50% 83.60%
Precision (Benign) 80.70% 89.10% 89.50%
F-measure (malicious) 79.50% 85.30% 86.50%
F-measure (benign) 80.50% 84.80% 86.30%
Table 9.2: Results of classification of malicious Bitly URLs using only Non-Click based features.
9.3 Feature Ranks
Some features in machine learning classification are more important and useful than others. In
this section, we describe the most informative features based on their ranks. We obtain this
ranking using Weka’s InfoGainAttributeEval package for attribute selection. 1 This technique
evaluates the worth of an attribute by measuring the information gain with respect to the class.
Fig 9.3 gives the ranked feature lists for classification experiments on complete and Non-Click
dataset. On a mix dataset of clicked and non-clicked links, Type of referring domains is found
Rank Feature
1 Type of referring domains
2 Link Creation domain cre-
ation difference
3 Domain age
4 Link creation hour
5 Type of encoders
6 Link creation-click lag
7 Number of encoders
(a)
Rank Feature
1 Link creation hour
2 Link Creation domain cre-
ation difference
3 Domain age
4 Type of encoders
5 Number of encoders
(b)
Figure 9.3: Feature rank based on information gain for classification on - (a) complete labeled-dataset.
(b) Non-Click labeled-dataset.
1http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/attributeSelection/InfoGainAttributeEval.html
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to be the most discriminating feature. Malicious Bitly links usually have more direct referrers,
i.e. such links are propagated more through email clients, mobile / chat applications, SMS, etc.
Such sources are often targeted by spammers because they have a direct impact on the user,
which increases the chances for a malicious link to be seen and visited. Link Creation domain
creation difference is another important feature based on information gain. As seen in Chapter 5,
offenders buy cheap domains for a deliberate purpose of spamming. Most of the offenders do not
wait and immediately start using these domains by shortening Bitly links. Since these domains
are mostly registered for a short time span, the objective of spammers is to fully exploit them
before they expire. The third most informative feature Domain age highlights the same.
Another strategy adopted by spammers is to shorten links at odd hours of the day, as depicted
by the fourth most informative feature Link creation hour. Such malicious users actually use
some automated scripts (bots) to bulk shorten Bitly links at odd hours. These links are then
shared on different sources at the time they expect targeted users to read. Other than these
top 4 features, Type of encoders, Link creation-click lag, and Number of encoders are found to
be comparatively less informative. This implies that these three features did not help much in
the classification. In case of classification using our Non-Click dataset, Link creation hour is
observed to be the most important feature. Remaining features follow the same ranking pattern
as in the complete dataset.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions, Limitation and Future
Work
In the first part of our study, we presented an overview of the general characteristics of malicious
Bitly links and their propagation on OSM. Spammers shorten malicious Bitly links by buying
cheap domains and registering them for a short period of time. We found 83.06% malicious
domain in our link-dataset that received 9,937,250 clicks on Bitly to be non-existent when we
rechecked after 5 months. Such domains are created for a dedicated purpose of spamming and
eventually die out after targeting a significant number of victims. In our referrer analysis, we
observed 52.84% Bitly click traffic to originate from a popular Hong Kong based discussion
forum, and 20.07% came from direct clicks. This trend is different from what has been generally
reported by the previous studies, where direct clicks contribute to the majority. Shift in the
approach of malicious users can be attributed to the large active user base and comparatively
less security mechanisms implemented on such portals. We also found that spammers exploit
Bitly’s policy of not imposing a cap on the number of connected OSM (Facebook / Twitter)
accounts. We traced such spammers and detected three malicious communities which operate
across Bitly and Twitter. In total, these communities composed of 31 Bitly accounts and 90
connected Twitter accounts spreading spam, scam, or explicit pornographic content.
In the second part of our study, we unveiled some loopholes in the security policies and mecha-
nisms used by Bitly. It was found that Bitly could not effectively detect malicious URLs already
tracked by the popular blacklist services like APWG and VirusTotal. We also observed that
Bitly could not detect 36.66% links identified by a domain blacklist called SURBL, which it
actually claims to use. This highlights the inefficiency of Bitly in using even the claimed spam
detection services effectively. We also detected significant traces of malicious users who abuse
Bitly’s no account suspension policy. 16.35% malicious users in our dataset kept shortening only
suspicious links in their history without being noticed. Also Bitly asserts that it forbids such
suspicious users from shortening more links, but we identified users who kept shortening bad
links for close to two years and their state of detection is still unknown. Finally, we also traced
highly popular Bitly links (with large number of warning pages displayed) and found 35.2% of
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them being clicked till date. This brings to light that a by-passable Bitly warning page is alone
not enough to curtail the overall problem of spam.
In the last part of our study, we proposed a mechanism to detect malicious links on Bitly.
We identified click based and non-click based features from Bitly and coupled them with some
domain specific features to classify a Bitly URL as malicious or benign. Computation of all
these features required close to 50 seconds per Bitly URL (Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2640 0
@ 2.50GHz). Our classifier predicted malicious links with the best accuracy of 80.40% on a
mix dataset of clicked and non-clicked links. By only considering non-click based features, our
classifier attained an improved accuracy of 83.51% on the mix dataset, and 86.41% on only
non-click dataset. Thus, our algorithm is not only efficient in detecting malicious Bitly links
when they receive user clicks, but can also identify suspicious links at zero hour, i.e. when no
click is received.
We performed our initial analysis on a limited dataset acquired from Bitly. This dataset captured
only links detected malicious by Bitly in the month of October 2013. Since the characteristics
of spammers change over time, we can do a detailed and comparative analysis on a more ex-
haustive dataset. Also, Bitly claims to forbid certain suspicious accounts but does not give this
information through its API. This created a trouble in interpreting if a dormant but highly
suspicious account in our dataset has been blocked by Bitly or not shortening the links itself.
For malicious Bitly link detection, our classifier currently works better on non-click dataset.
This is because we used only 2 click-based features in our classification. In future, we would
also like to study as to how click patterns on a malicious Bitly URL evolve over time. This
would require a temporal analysis and can serve as another good feature for our classifier.
In order to evade on submission check by the URL shorteners, malicious users many a times
shorten an already shortened link. This multi-level link obfuscation can therefore be used as
another important feature. We can also include the user profile attributes like suspicion-factor
for each encoder to achieve better results. This would require extracting encoder information
and analyzing their click history for each link. We understand that such an evaluation is a time
consuming process. Therefore, we did not include these parameters and performed our current
study on only some lightweight and easily computable features. As a part of our future work, we
would like to include these parameters since incorporation of such discriminating features can
help improve the overall performance of our classifiers. We can also broaden and generalize our
feature set to detect spam from any short URL services. In addition, we would like to develop a
browser extension that can work in real time and classify any short link as malicious or benign.
Appending a single plus sign to a Bitly URL gives the corresponding analytics, we can introduce
a double plus sign here to get the credibility analytics for the same URL. Such a service can be
very useful in short URL spam detection across multiple online media.
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